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I. Why Do Phishing Attempts Still Work? 
 
Despite numerous efforts to raise awareness about phishing scam emails, the 
number of phishing attacks continues to grow significantly each year. According to 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), between 2014 and 2018 phishing 
complaints increased more than 20%, with the financial losses increasing more than 
100%, amounting to a total loss of $7.45 billion (FBI, 2018). The email phishing 
attacks of today are an evolution of similar techniques that can be traced back at 
least to the 19th century. Exploring the history of pre-internet swindling schemes 
helps draw a bigger picture of the current phishing and scamming methods. One of 
the most common 19th-century techniques was the “Spanish Prisoner Letter” where 
the scammer made a request to their target audience for token amounts of money 
to help the prisoner to retrieve their treasures. The Spanish Prisoner Letter scam 
continued to evolve with changing storylines and targets through the regular mail 
services until the postal inspectors noticed the flood of scam mail items and started 
warning people about it (Train, 1910). 
 We generated an idea for modeling key factors of digital phishing, such as 
prevalence, frequency, and effectiveness. However, finding a corpus of recent 
phishing emails proved to be almost impossible due to privacy and user information 
concerns. Companies are reluctant to provide researchers with phishing emails 
targeted at their server and users because they may hold sensitive information. After 
the Facebook–Cambridge Analytica scandal data came to light, companies and 
organizations became more stringent and wary about releasing data to researchers. 
We contacted several data centers and information researchers about sharing 
phishing emails for research purposes, but they all refused for the above-mentioned 
reasons. We turned to our home institution, the University of North Texas (UNT) 
email server.  
 
II. Background for a Model 
 
a. Distinguishing Deception from Lying  
 
Lying is an act of delivering a false statement to a victim with the intention of 
making the target believe the statement. Deceiving someone requires intentionally 
causing the victim to believe a premeditated set of actions and speeches that will 
shape a false notion (Mahon, 2015). The two terms are often used interchangeably, 
though we rely here on a subtle difference – where “to lie” simply means to tell an 
“untruth,” “to deceive” has its roots in “to ensnare, to trap.” Deception is usually 
done with illusions and tricks of facts to make targets fall into the trap (O’Connor, 
Copeland & Kearns, 2003). According to one study, humans lie at least once a day 
(Feldman, Forrest & Happ, 2002). 
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b. Psychology of Deception 
 
Phishing attacks typically rely on the psychology of deception. Deception in its 
various forms results from pervasive and adaptive phenomena. Dating back to the 
1920s, entomologists (Wheeler, 1926) began studying and attempting to categorize 
levels of social behavior in animal species by observing parenting styles and mating 
rituals of different insects and animals. Socio-biologists (Wadsworth, Wilson & 
Barker, 1975) further expanded the species by looking at social behavior patterns 
of insects and animals into rudimentary forms of deceptive activity within and 
among different species. Knowledge of these rudimentary forms of deceptive 
activities led to a deception hypothesis in comparative psychology. Non-humans 
display different deception practices according to their surroundings, ranging from 
household pets seeking attention, to wild animals evading predators, and 
hierarchical groupings of apes and wolves. In humans a progression of these 
deceptive activities advances into a manipulative type of premeditated deception 
commonly seen in humans. 
Premeditated deception is a behavior deliberately planned for a personal 
gain of advantage over another by hiding the truth or manipulating facts. In a study 
with fifty infants, Reddy (2008) found that infants as young as six months old 
pretend to cry just to attract the mother’s attention (Reddy, 2008). Knowledge of 
deception dates, at least, back to the creation myths of the Abrahamic religions 
(Qur’an 2:35–36). Nowadays, technology has helped in creating new techniques 
and methods of deception that are enhanced by the expansion of human interaction. 
Engaging with targets is no longer limited to personal contact or slow and costly 
distant contact with a fairly small number of people; the digital environment 
essentially erases most boundaries and barriers. 
 
c. Email Deception Theory  
 
An electronic mail (email) vector is a specially crafted and distributed method of 
enticing targets to perform actions that will make their personal data available to 
attackers. The email vector is advantageous to the phishers because of the ease of 
distribution to a large quantity of recipients at very low cost. Furthermore, it 
conceals the geographical location of the sender. The FBI has modeled the typical 
steps in the phishing lifecycle (Figure 1). This lifecycle can vary in duration 
depending on the final goal or attack method of the phishing perpetrator. Email 
phishing is typically initiated with a target acquisition process which begins when 
an individual visits any online location which has less than optimum security 
features, as in step 1. Perhaps the most critical part of the lifecycle is step 2 
(grooming), because the success of the entire phishing attack relies on successfully 
gaining the trust of the target. Step 3 is characterized by the exchange of 
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information between the target and the attacker. The attackers gather information 
relevant to the final goal by asking questions, seeking sympathy, implanting 
malware on the target’s communications device, or directing the target to a specific 
online location that surreptitiously harvests information such as passwords and user 
information, or sometimes seeking nude photos for a future blackmail. In step 4, if 
the overall goal of the phishing attempt is solely monetary extortion as is the case 
of individual petty phishing scam, the attacker demands payment via wire transfer 
of funds to a location of the attackers choosing. If the phishing attack is only a 
portion of a larger scheme, further information or direction is given to the target 
with a laundry list of expectations to fulfill. Varying technical approaches are used 









Figure 1: Email Phishing Steps (FBI, 2018) 
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III. Foundational Theory for Modeling Successful Phishing 
 
We used the functional ontological construction (FOC) model, which was proposed 
by Anderson (2006) as a pragmatic approach to understanding the relationship 
between human behavior and the information environment. The model emerges 
from the application of behavior analytic theory to problems in information science. 
FOC is a multicomponent model which relies heavily on empirical history and 
behavioral analysis. The first component of the model is based on a binary model 
of documents inspired by Shannon and Weaver’s information theory, Eco’s theory 
of semiotics, Wittgenstein’s notion of language games, Skinner’s theory of verbal 
behavior, and Dawkins’ theory of memes (Dawkins, 2014; Eco, 1986; Shannon & 
Weaver, 1948; Skinner, 1957; Wittgenstein, 1953). The second component of the 
model is based on the functional ontological space that engages both the user and 
document in a common ontological context. This ontological context covers 
behaviors such as information seeking by users, and the preference for documents 
that satisfy user needs. The third component of the model is based on the functional 
ontological implications of the model. User interaction with documents has a 
selective function on the user behavior, and in turn the user behavior has a selective 
function on the document. The model is sometimes referred to as ABC because it 
is formed around Antecedents, Behaviors, and Consequences. 
 
IV. Framework and Methodology 
 
Email communication offers large information carrying capacity and a nearly 
ubiquitous information sharing channel, especially in a higher education institution 
such as University of North Texas (UNT). UNT’s email server, known as 
EagleConnect Email System, serves the official email communication needs of 
students, employees, retirees, and alumni; and as of March 10, 2021, the UNT email 
system has over 251,000 accounts and an average of close to 40,000 active monthly 
users. Also, UNT’s staff and students send a monthly average of 10,000 emails and 
receive 110,000 emails, and the UNT’s staff and students read close to 30% of the 
received emails. The email accounts are hosted on the Microsoft Office 365 
platform, and therefore emails are automatically filtered for phishing attempts 
through the Microsoft Office 365 filtering system. Microsoft Office 365 has over 
258 million active on-premises or cloud-based exchange users spanning across 
schools, healthcare, financial services, companies (70% of Fortune 500 
companies), and governments. The phishing emails used in this study successfully 
bypassed the Microsoft office 365 phishing filtering systems to reach the email end 
user. The end users had reported the phishing emails to the network administrator 
who archived the email samples on a different email folder. The simple fact that 
4
Proceedings from the Document Academy, Vol. 8 [2021], Iss. 2, Art. 8
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/docam/vol8/iss2/8
DOI: 10.35492/docam/8/2/8
these phishing emails passed through a rigorous and well-regarded filtering system 
demonstrates that they were good at deception. 
 Over the period from October 17, 2018, to October 10, 2019, 432 phishing 
emails that passed the Microsoft Office 365 filtering system were reported and 
archived on the UNT server for a period of 12 months. The emails have different 
features, characters, length, context, and semantics; thus, the collected data is 
unstructured. While we had a significant sample of phishing emails, privacy 
policies presented the methodological challenge of not being able to reach out to 
the phishing email targets to gather detailed data from their end of the transactions. 
 
V. Results and Analysis 
 
Our explorations revealed that UNT staff and students are more heavily targeted 
with phishing emails in the Summer, and during the holiday season when students 
and staff are more likely to need extra money. Most successful deception emails 
were found to start by forming an engaging email subject line. We found that email 
scammers used the information theory gap as a bait to fool email recipients to open 
phishing emails. According to Ben-Haim (2006), information gap theory is “a non-
probabilistic decision theory for prioritizing alternatives and making choices and 
decisions under deep uncertainty.” For example, marketers often form a shadowy 
link title to draw viewers’ attention to click on the link such as “how to become rich 
in few steps.” In our corpus, scammers used a completely blank subject line in fifty 
emails (~15%) to deceive recipients into opening the phishing email. Ambiguity is 
a strong stimulus to humans, and it is being used by scammers to encourage human 
curiosity to open phishing emails (Livio, 2017). 
 In the quantitative analysis of the corpus, TF-IDF and LDA were useful in 
analyzing documents and raw text to provide insight into the topics of the 
document. The results from the LDA and TF-IDF analyses present similar 
outcomes despite the differences in statistical models. The results from both models 
show that the corpus has three primary topics: finance, jobs, and technology.   
 In the qualitative analysis of the corpus, we used the categories derived by 
Cofense, formerly PhishMe, a leading provider of human-driven phishing defense 
solutions and we manually categorized the emails into six categories: 
opportunity/reward, curiosity, urgency, fear, job, and social/entertainment. The 
graph shows the distributions for email per category (see Figure 2 below). 
 Also, we categorized the emails by reinforcer type – essentially promise of 
a reward or threat of a punishment. We found that most scammers used a positive 
reinforcer with 131 phishing emails in the corpus, a stimulus that promises positive 
feedback such as a job offering. Next, scammers used the penalty technique in 74 
phishing emails where the target is being threatened with losing something; 
commonly the scammer asks recipients to update their login credentials, or they are 
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going to lose access to their email inbox. In 56 of the phishing emails there were 
general negative reinforcements where the type of the negative reinforcer is not 
specified. For example, a scammer might try to steal the identity of a person in 
authority and send an email to one of the employees with something like “Let me 
know when you are available.”. Moreover, in 43 of the emails in the dataset 
scammers use the information gap theory to get a reply from targets; commonly, 
they send an email such as: “Are you available” to get a reply. Since it is not known 
what the scammer wants, these types of emails could fall into both positive or 
negative reinforcement category. The phishing emails that came under both 
categories have no indications or signs what the scammer is asking for unless the 
recipient of the phishing email replies to it and that is why it could be both positive 
reinforcer or negative reinforcer. In 22 of the emails the reinforcement was 
punishment negative, in which a scammer blackmails a target by threatening to 
expose them online unless there is payment with cryptocurrency.  
 In only 20 of the 432 phishing emails (~5%) involved any response 
exchange between email recipients and phishing attacker. The other 95% of 
phishing emails were reported to the information security team without 
communication with the attacker. Of those 20 responses, 14 were prompted by 
credit card phishing attackers posing as a superior requesting a subordinate 
employee to purchase redeemable gift cards for a company or personal event. The 
targets of the credit card attacks reported these phishing emails after at least one 
reply to the attacker, though the data show no email recipient actually made the 
requested purchase. The remaining six of the response-exchanged phishing emails 
were in three categories: malicious files, job offerings, and a request to pay a bill. 
Only two of the phishing email recipients from the twenty response-exchanged 
emails fell for the phishing attack. One fell victim to a false job offering and lost 
about $3,000 to the attacker, while the other employee fell for a malicious attack. 
 
VI. Documenting Phishing Emails 
 
We built an analysis tool by Elastic on the findings of this research for easier data 
collection in the future and to create automated reports about the phishing emails 
that the organization is targeted with. We used the programming language PHP to 
create an app to connect the IMAP server to Elasticsearch and parse the emails and 
attachments into meaningful fields in Elasticsearch. The analysis tool runs indexes 
to extracts the important fields from each email to Elasticsearch every night, as 
shown in Table 1. The collected emails in Elasticsearch can be easily extracted to 
CSV files or any other formats for future research and analysis.  
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VII. Creating a Visualized Phishing Email Report with Kibana 
 
Kibana is an add-on that can be installed on the top on Elasticsearch to add a user-
friendly interface to Elasticsearch with no need of a knowledge of coding to use 
Elasticsearch. Kibana gives users the ability to customize slides with different 
metrics in with the option selecting time period. In a matter of seconds, the 
visualization metrics can be adjusted easily and can show phishing emails that dated 
back to March 2014 since the creation of the phishing emails inbox. Figure 2 is a 
screenshot of a visualization of the emails that the information security team 
received since 2014. 
 
VIII. Deception in Phishing Emails Model 
 
Figure 3 summarizes how scammers form their phishing emails. Firstly, if it is a 
spear phishing attack or a regular email phishing attack, scammers choose a topic 
depending on the pervious information they know about the target either as an 
individual or as an organization. Then, scammers pick from the five available 
categories to decide what type of reinforcement to use. Then they decide between 
encouraging the email recipients in a nice way or threatening them with a 
blackmail. Lastly, scammers form their phishing email with attractive wordings that 






Figure 3: ABC model of Phishing Emails  
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In this study, phishing emails that successfully passed through the Microsoft 365 
email filtering system to the UNT staff and students were reported and archived in 
a phishing email inbox by UNT’s security team as the primary dataset. Our dataset 
contained 432 phishing emails that were archived between October 2018 and 
October 2019. The phishing emails were studied from both technical and 
psychological angles to identify why an advanced filtering system such as 
Microsoft 365 email phishing defense system failed to prevent delivery of these 
phishing emails.  
In this research, we used a mixed method to analyze the data. In the 
quantitative analysis, we used topic modeling and TF-IDF to get an overview of 
what are the topics of the studied email corpus. We found out that the emails could 
be categorized into three topics namely: jobs, finance, and technology. On the 
qualitative side of the analysis, we used Anderson’s functional construction 
ontology theory to study the interaction between a human and a document, and we  
discovered that scammers use positive and negative reinforcement with different 
types of stimuli as a motivation to swindle email recipients. Furthermore, we 
categorized the emails into 6 different categories based on the reinforcements used: 
opportunity or reward, job, urgency, curiosity, fear, and social/entertainment.  
Based on B. F. Skinner’s reinforcement theory, we identified that all four 
different types of theoretical stimuli were used to defraud email recipients. The 
attackers used positive reinforcement to promise a prize or reward to the email 
recipient, and they used negative reinforcement to threaten the email recipients with 
unwanted potential consequences.  
In addition, we observed that attackers used the information gap theory to 
scam email recipients by sending them either empty email subject or empty email 
body. This information gap technique accounted for 30% of the emails in our 
corpus having either an empty subject or body.  
Moreover, a statistical visualization showed that the university staff 
received more phishing emails in the summer and winter holiday seasons. This 
seasonality was further explored to identify that some of the universities staff not 
paid during the summer months usually search for temporary jobs to fill the pay 
gap, and the attackers take advantage of this opportunity to offer fake job openings 
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